Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Adapted from a presentation at a Belgian-sponsored meeting at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa.

Alex Vines*

In September 2005 the UN Security Council acknowledged the link between natural resources and conflict in resolution 1625. My interest in conflict resources began in the late 1980s when writing a book on the former rebel movement in Mozambique – the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana. I found that when the rebels enjoyed significant covert support from apartheid South Africa they could afford to conduct some hearts and minds efforts. As this assistance dried up, however, they became more brutal and focused on attaining whatever commodity they could capture. In the early 1990s, I saw the same pattern in Angola with UNITA rebels. American academic William Reno outlined similar patterns in Sierra Leone. The important point to make is that in all these cases any commodity could do – Mozambique was not mineral rich, but tea, cashews, prawns and ransom and protection payments all played a role in the conflict.

There is some discussion on reaching a common working definition of conflict resources. My experience is that this is difficult to define; even the abduction of people can become a commoditized resource during times of conflict, as is increasingly the case in the Niger Delta, for example.

Security Council Sanctions

In the 1990s the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) started to impose more embargoes – some which included commodities. I will not dwell on petroleum embargoes here (such as in Haiti or Sierra Leone, or those proposed on the export of crude oil from Sudan) as they are a speech in themselves. There have also been recommendations for other commodities to be sanctioned – for example, fish in Somalia or the illegal extraction of all natural resources in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - but these recommendations have not found widespread support in the UNSC because of politics or because of the overambitious motives of those proposing them.

For now I will examine the evolution of efforts to target natural resources such as diamonds and timber: Diamond embargoes in Angola (1998) and Sierra Leone (2000); Liberia (2001) and Côte d’Ivoire (2005) and timber in the case of Liberia (2003).

The work of Canadian Robert Fowler to revive the Angola Sanctions Committee coupled with effective NGO advocacy by Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada contributed a momentum. The diamond industry responded with what is now known as the Kimberley Process. The diamond sanctions, I believe, worked in different ways.

Let us look first at Sierra Leone – topical this week as the trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court on Sierra Leone starts in The Hague. Pro-active investigation in 2000 by a UN expert group on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)’s access to diamonds resulted in the panel’s recommendation that the UN Security Council adopt secondary sanctions on Liberia. These sanctions loosened Mr. Taylor’s grip on the RUF and allowed other processes to take over. Smuggling of rough diamonds through Liberia declined (although some smuggling continued, and did so, I believe, until the embargo was lifted recently).

In Angola’s complicated diamond trade it was Angolan military action, including in Congo Brazzaville and DRC, that weakened UNITA. However, the UN’s naming and shaming of diamond dealers involved in Angola resulted in a migration of key characters to Sierra Leone and Liberia in 2000. In Angola, a light was turned on, and the roaches scurried elsewhere. In Liberia, where the smuggling of Sierra Leone diamonds that was the main issue, the sanctions caused a reverse problem – Liberian rough diamonds went to Sierra Leone, Gambia, and probably Ghana and entered other certification schemes.

Côte d’Ivoire is also under a UN diamond embargo. For the rebel Forces Nouvelle (FN) diamond trading provided funds especially for the FN in the Seguela region, but were not a key commodity. Cocoa, timber, and sugar cane were all more important. Much of the revenue from these commodities was accrued by taxation of traffic. Diamond sanctions in Côte d’Ivoire were an easy choice for the Council – a political statement and consensus already reached on the concept – but these sanctions also strengthened Kimberley efforts because all Ivorian diamond production is in rebel areas.

Whatever the case, I believe such efforts create space for reformers to work, although the lifting of such measures will always be political. I am not sure if the UN is well-equipped enough to work in these post conflict situations to track financial and budgetary flows comprehensively. In tracking funds, the International Financial Institutions through their Article IV Consultations and country assessments are much better placed to do so. I believe that there are moments that the Council should mandate the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund to provide assessments and not just rely on expert group reports.

The UN’s Peacebuilding Commission is an important tool to consider. Security Council members such as Belgium and South Africa could assist in trying to make this Commission more effective. My own institute, Chatham House, launched a report on Sierra Leone this June, highlighting the risks of a relapse to conflict if more is not done by the winners of August’s elections to reform government, tackle corruption and address endemic youth unemployment. Once peacekeepers leave and sanctions are lifted, initiatives like the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission become very important.

When the Council considers imposing commodity sanctions, it is important to include an independent humanitarian impact assessment. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) assessments have recently drawn criticism, however, these types of reports are important. Expert Groups are structured to seek sanctions and do not easily sit with humanitarian impact evaluation. The concept of a separate independent report (this need not necessarily be by OCHA) is a good one – it is then up to the UNSC to make its mind up about the information provided to it.

Quality of reporting is essential; the reports of the Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo are salutary. I believe that sharp, short lists of individuals under UN targeted measures with clear indicators and transparent justification by the UNSC, backed by a monitoring of their compliance, are the way forward. My experience leads me to believe that when this is done well, it is a very powerful tool of the Council. The Best Practices and Recommendations for Improving the Effectiveness of UN Sanctions has been highlighted by the Security Council Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions in its December 2006 Report, so I will not say too much more except to thank Greece and the UN Secretariat for this excellent initiative.

National law enforcement agencies can also make an important contribution, as they can act upon quality information provided by expert groups or member states. Cases such as those of Samih Ossaily and Aziz Nassour of Asa Diam [i] and Gus Van Kouwenhoven of the Oriental Timber Company [ii] can raise the bar and act as deterrents. These cases were first highlighted by UN Panels, then aided with the help of NGO advocacy, and finally picked up by law enforcement agencies to result in jail sentences. Such processes take time but the key is quality data from which to provide leads for law enforcement agencies.

Finally, I want to flag a continuing problem. The UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations at the New York symposium mentioned that perhaps peacekeepers needed to consider maps of natural resources before deploying. Even before targeting others, first do no harm. The engagement of UN peacekeepers in trading natural resources or in business relationships with target groups can be a serious problem. I have dealt with this situation in Cote d’Ivoire, and resolved the problem by arranging for the majority diamond area monitoring to be done by air. Recently the BBC highlighted allegations that UN peacekeepers from Pakistan had engaged in the gold trade and exchanged weapons.[iii] It is interesting to note that some date-stamps of bullets from ammunition confiscated from rebel groups by MONUC are by the Pakistan Ordnance Factory. I have been in a similar situation with lost UN munitions in Côte d’Ivoire. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations needs to have its own independent inspectors in the field to ensure that this type of trade does not occur and contributing forces to UN missions should clearly mark their arms and ammunition so that accounting for this type of situation is easier.

 

[i] Samih Ossaily and Aziz Nassour, along with six others, were sent to jail in early 2005 for illegally dealing diamonds from Sierra Leone and the DRC. Asa Diam, Nassour’s brother’s company, was fined US$87.1 million for failing to declare diamonds to customs.

[ii] Gus Van Kouwenhoven, Former Managing Director of the Oriental Timber Company, was found guilty of violating a UN arms embargo in Liberia and sentenced to eight years in prison in June 2006.

[iii] See UN Troops 'traded gold for guns'.

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